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Product Imitation
John P. Diamond*
T HE WAVE OF IMITATION sweeping through competitive Amer-
ican business has crowded the courts with unfair competi-
tion cases. The most recent and representative of these cases will
be examined here.
The ironic aspect of unfair competition is that the party to
whom the misrepresentation is made is the consuming public, yet
rarely does a consumer bring an action. In the usual case the
action is brought by the party whose trade has been diminished'
by another palming off his goods as those of the plaintiff 2 so that
confusion develops as to the source of the goods.3 Thus the gist
of the charge in an unfair competition case is that the public is
so misled that the plaintiff loses trade by reason of the decep-
tion.4
It has been said that unfair competition requires something
affirmative and does not automatically pick up what patent and
copyright laws omit.5 It is well settled that, when an article is
capable of general manufacture, a particular manufacturer not
having an exclusive patent on the article may not assert exclu-
sive rights to a form if the public does not associate the form
with a particular source.6
The acid test in the law of unfair competition is the likeli-
hood of the public being deceived 7 as to the origin of merchan-
* B.M.E., M.M.E., Cornell University; Contract Administrator at Thompson
Ramo Wooldridge Inc., of Cleveland; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Allstate Investment Corp., 210 F. Supp. 25 (W.
D. La. 1962).
2 Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 214 F. Supp. 664 (S. D. N. Y.
1963); but see A. J. Sandy, Inc. v. Junior City, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 407,
234 N. Y. S. 2d 508 (1st Dept. 1962) where it was held that the scope of
liability for unfair competition goes beyond the restricted concept of palm-
ing off.
3 Robins Industries Corp. v. David Riemer Co., 312 F. 2d 889 (2d Cir. 1963).
4 Revlon, Inc. v. Regal Pharmacy, Inc., 29 F. R. D. 169 (E. D. Mich. 1961).
5 O'Day Corp. v. Talman Corp., 310 F. 2d 623 (1st Cir. 1962).
6 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 59 Sup. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed.
73, rehear, den., 305 U. S. 674, 59 Sup. Ct. 246, 83 L. Ed. 437 (1938); Rytex
Co. v. Ryan, 126 F. 2d 952 (7th Cir. 1942); Merry Mfg. Co. v. Burns Tool
Co., 206 F. Supp. 53 (N. D. Ga. 1962).
7 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Lee, 27 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Cal. App. 1963).
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dise.8 The mere possibility that customers will be misled is not
enough.9 Since the consumer public is entitled to know the
source of the goods it desires to purchase the courts are always
alert to eliminate the possibility of deceit.10
A finding of unfair competition rests more easily upon the
judicial conscience when there are at least some indicia of fraud.
A recent California decision held that there is an element of
fraud in all unfair competition cases although the fraud involved
may be constructive rather than actual." An open approach to
the problem was adopted by the Seventh Circuit where the opin-
ion indicated that the controlling principle in unfair competition
cases is a little old fashioned honesty.
12
Among the elements to be considered in determining if de-
fendant is unfairly competing by imitating plaintiff's product are
similarity in appearance, design and color such that a customer
exercising ordinary care is induced to buy the defendant's prod-
uct in the belief plaintiff's goods are being purchased.13
Functional Features
It is generally accepted that product features which are
utilitarian and functional do not acquire a secondary meaning,
and therefore, in the absence of actual consumer deception the
imitating defendant is not guilty of unfair competition. 14 Com-
petition permits product imitation 15 but only as to those features
of the original goods that are not in any way essential to their
use.16 One who imitates features must take reasonable precau-
8 Atlas Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Farber Bros., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 61 (W. D. Tenn.
1961).
9 Surgical Supply Service, Inc. v. Adler, 321 F. 2d 536 (3rd Cir. 1963).
10 King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F. 2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963).
11 Visser v. Macres, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Cal. App. 1963).
12 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F. 2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
See also Neely v. Boland Mfg. Co., 274 F. 2d 195 (8th Cir. 1960).
13 Venn v. Goedert, 206 F. Supp. 361 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd. 319 F. 2d 812
(8th Cir. 1963).
14 Norman Products Co. v. Sequoia Mfg. Co., 107 F. Supp. 928 (N. D. Cal.
1952).
15 Jack Daniel Distillery, Inc. v. Hoffman Distilling Co., 190 F. Supp. 841
(W. D. Ky. 1960); Bostitch, Inc. v. King Fastener Co., 87 R. I. 274, 140 A. 2d
274, rearg. den. 87 R. I. 274, 140 A. 2d 768 (1958).
16 American-Marietta Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F. 2d 287 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tions to inform prospective customers that the goods he markets
are not those of the other manufacturer.'
7
In the recent case of Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Co.,'"
it was held that defendant was not guilty of competing unfairly
where he used a fabric label sewn into his neckties which con-
tained advice on color combinations the tie could be worn with,
notwithstanding that plaintiff had conceived the device and used
it extensively in its advertising campaign "The Tie with the Color
Guide." The court held that the label was a "mere functional
characteristic" and that a deliberate attempt to compete is not
equivalent to a deliberate attempt to deceive prospective pur-
chasers.
This liberal interpretation of "functional features" was re-
cently affirmed in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.19 where
the court held that a feature is functional so that copying is not
unfair competition
. . . if it affects their purpose, action, or performance, or
facility or economy of processing, handling or using them,
and possibly also if it affects the buyer's choice because of
its pleasing appearance.
20
However, the court determined that defendant must take
further steps, with respect to display cards, to differentiate its
lighter from plaintiff's, since there was a substantial likelihood
of confusion.
Where plaintiff's flash bulbs were characterized by a blue
dot which had acquired a secondary meaning, the dot was
found to be functional (as an air leak indicator) and it was held
that defendant could imitate this functional feature in every re-
spect as long as defendant took reasonable steps to inform pro-
spective purchasers that the bulbs were not manufactured by
plaintiff.2
1
Where the plaintiff manufactured and sold plastic tomato-
shaped catsup and mustard dispensers, colored red and yellow,
17 H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Whiting Milk. Co., 186 N. E. 2d 904 (Mass.
1963).
18 216 F. Supp. 265 (D. Md. 1963).
19 216 F. Supp. 670 (S. D. N. Y. 1963).
20 Id. at page 695.
21 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Dura Electric Lamp Co., 247 F. 2d 730
(3rd Cir. 1957). See also Remington Research, Inc. v. Modern Aids, Inc.,
170 F. Supp. 7 (S. D. N. Y. 1959); General Radio Co. v. Superior Electric
Co., 321 F. 2d 857 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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respectively, it was held that these features served merely to
indicate the contents of the dispenser and hence were functional
features which could be copied.
22
Thus it appears that the broad definition of "functional" as
set forth in the Zippo23 case will sweep in virtually all but the
most decorative features of a product.
Design
In general, completely copying an article of trade is permitted
without something more that would amount to a misrepresenta-
tion.2 4 An imitator's desire to endow his product with physical
requirements essential to success does not result in unfair com-
petition. It is not necessary to change the appearance of a prod-
uct nor to sacrifice strength, durability or cheapness to avoid a
similar appearance. 25 Thus where defendant copied plaintiff's
pitchers in every detail, but these features were found to be
functional, a claim for unfair competition was not established.
26
On the other hand, where defendant copied the design and ap-
pearance of plaintiff's commercial record files, defendant was
enjoined from further imitation and from making and selling
files of the same dimensions. 27
When marketing goods identical in appearance to those of
plaintiff, defendant is required to take reasonable precautions to
avoid deception of potential customers. 28 For example, where the
opposing parties marketed physically identical recreational de-
vices through the same trade channels, there was such substan-
tial likelihood of confusion between plaintiff's registered trade
mark "Pitch Back" and defendant's mark "Pitch-N-Field" that
plaintiff was granted injunctive relief.29 Similarly, defendant's
name on the bottom of ash trays, which were identical to plain-
22 Squeezit Corp. v. Plastic Dispensers, Inc., 31 N. J. Super. 217, 106 A. 2d
322 (1954).
23 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, supra, n. 19.
24 Husten v. Buckeye Bait Corp., 145 F. Supp. 600 (S. D. Ohio 1955), affd.
237 F. 2d 920 (6th Cir. 1958); Jessar Mfg. Corp. v. Berlin, 380 Pa. 453, 110 A.
2d 396 (1955).
25 West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F. 2d, 581 (6th Cir.
1955), cert. den., 350 U. S. 840, 76 Sup. Ct. 80, 100 L. Ed. 749 (1955).
26 Bliss v. Gotham Industries, Inc., 316 F. 2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963).
27 Diebold, Inc. v. Record Files, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 74 (N. D. Ohio 1955).
28 Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306 F. 2d 251 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. den. 371 U. S. 910, 83 Sup. Ct. 253, 9 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1962).
29 Tigrett Industries, Inc. v. Top Value Industries, 217 F. Supp. 313 (W. D.
Tenn. 1963).
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tiff's, was held insufficient to prevent deception and palming off.30
Where defendant chose precisely the same design for ribbing
used by plaintiff on the reflectors of its commercial fluorescent
light fixtures, confusion relative to the source of the fixtures was
likely, and defendant was guilty of unfair competition, even
though plaintiff's design patent was invalid.3 1
The fact that a dealer associates a particular design with a
particular source does not tend to show that the ordinary con-
sumer will make the same association.32 The requirement for a
showing of unfair competition is that a reasonably careful pur-
chaser would be misled as to the source of the goods.33
In Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structures Corp. of Amer-
ica3 4 it was held that since plaintiff's identifying model numbers
on scaffolding and related products had acquired a secondary
meaning, defendant was unfairly competing by attaching the
same model numbers to the imitations. Further, the court re-
fused to enjoin plaintiff's circularization of a notice that he was
suing defendant for patent and trade mark infringement, breach
of contract and unfair competition, on the theory that anyone
has the right to inform the trade about court actions. Similarly,
in Al-Fab Aluminum Fabricators, Inc. v. Wagner,3 5 where de-
fendant not only copied plaintiff's window, but advertised the
imitations with photographs of the original windows, plaintiff
was permitted to circularize a threat to sue defendant's custom-
ers, providing that he acted in good faith and did not try to in-
timidate those who would not be under legal liability for selling
defendant's product. However, where defendant sold copies of
abrasive segments which varied slightly from the original but
still fitted plaintiff's original chuck, and used the designation
given to such segments by plaintiff, there was no unfair com-
petition, since the designations were of shape and in accordance
with custom. 36
30 Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S. D. Cal.
1954).
31 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., supra n. 12.
32 American Luggage Works, Inc. v. U. S. Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D.
Mass. 1957), affd. 259 F. 2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958).
38 Allen v. Standard Crankshaft and Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 (W. D.
N. C. 1962).
34 220 F. Supp. 724 (S. D. Cal. 1963).
.35 220 F. Supp. 715 (N. D. Ill. 1963).
36 Titcomb v. Norton Co., 208 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1959), affd. 307 F. 2d
253 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Van Brode Milling Co. v. Cox Air Gauge Sys-
tern, 161 F. Supp. 437 (S. D. Cal. 1958), affd. 279 F. 2d 313 (9th Cir. 1960).
May, 1964
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In a recent New York decision it was held that defendant
had not competed unfairly where defendant promoted its bongo
drums by purchasing plaintiff's drums, removing their mark and
affixing its own, and using the drums as samples. Defendant also
photographed plaintiff's drums and used the pictures in its adver-
tising, after retouching the photographs to remove plaintiff's
mark. The court held that there was no unfair competition where
there was no palming off of the product and where the plaintiff
did not have patent rights in its product . 7 In affirming,38 the
New York Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff's lack of success
in the common law unfair competition action did not bar him
from seeking relief under the false designation provisions of the
Lanham Act.3 9
In subsequent proceedings under the Lanham Act, plaintiff
recovered on the theory that defendant's merchandise was in-
ferior to the sample obtained from plaintiff, and plaintiff was
thereby damaged. 40
Color
Although color is an element to consider where palming off
is in issue, generally one cannot claim a monopoly on color in
connection with a particular line of trade. In H. P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Whiting Milk Co.,41 it was held that although defendant
may have intended to imitate by using a red color on its milk
cartons which were identical in size and shape to plaintiff's, de-
fendant was entitled to use a red color since the design was rea-
sonably distinguished from the design on plaintiff's carton. How-
ever, where one manufacturer completely copies the prior user's
product in every detail, including color, there is a strong infer-
ence that defendant intended to trade on plaintiff's reputation,
particularly since defendant's product was of a markedly inferior
quality.42 In another recent case it was held that the manufac-
37 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 420,
228 N. Y. S. 2d 514 (1st Dept. 1962).
58 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 12 N. Y. 2d 826, 187 N.
E. 2d 360, 236 N. Y. S. 2d 347 (1962).
39 Trade Mark Act (1946), 60 Stat. 427, § 43(a), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1125(a).
40 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 600,
240 N. Y. Supp. 2d 624 (1st Dept. 1963). See also Zandelin v. Maxwell
Bentley Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 608 (S. D. N. Y. 1961).
41 Supra n. 17. See also Venn v. Goedert, supra n. 13.
42 Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, supra n. 30.
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turer of inflatable plastic world globes could not have a monop-
oly on their size nor on the color used to designate the polar
areas.
43
It is possible for a color to have functional attributes which
would render the particular color incapable of exclusive appro-
priation. Thus in Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,"4
it was held that plaintiff could not exclusively appropriate the
color pink for an upset stomach remedy (Pepto-Bismol) since
a functional value might be found in the color because of its
soothing effect upon the sufferer.
Similarly it has been held that the physical appearance, size,
shape and color of medicinal capsules are functional features.
However, since defendant copied plaintiff's products and sug-
gested to druggists that defendant's product could be substituted
when those products were ordered by physicians, and they gave
druggists cards which listed the substitutes for plaintiff's prod-
ucts, defendant was found to have competed unfairly.4 5
Secondary Meaning
It is public association with a particular source that gives
rise to a secondary meaning. A product acquires this meaning
when its form and design identifies the product with its manu-
facturer, and purchasers are influenced to buy the product be-
cause of its identification.46 Thus, where plaintiff's model num-
bers for scaffolding had acquired a secondary meaning, it was
an invasion of this secondary meaning for defendant to ap-
propriate these model numbers for its imitation product.47 Where
plaintiff manufactured inexpensive articles which were imitated
by defendant, plaintiff's unfair competition action did fail for
lack of showing that a secondary meaning had attached to its
products, because purchasers, relying on the apparent quality
43 C. S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp.
206 (S. D. N. Y. 1962).
44 271 F. 2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. den. 362 U. S. 919, 80 Sup. Ct. 671, 4 L.
Ed. 2d 739 (1960), revg. 167 F. Supp. 427 (N. D. N. Y. 1958).
45 Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F. 2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957).
46 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Manners Jewelers, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 845 (E. D. La.
1960).
47 Waco-Porter Corp. v. Tubular Structure Corp. of America, supra n. 34.
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and eye appeal of the product itself, might believe that the com-
peting articles were from the same source.
48
A secondary meaning may become attached to a product
even though the consumer is not aware of the source. 49 It is
sufficient that prospective purchasers associate the non-functional
attributes of goods with a particular manufacturer whose iden-
tity may be unknown.50 Once a secondary meaning has attached,
the likelihood of confusion becomes the ultimate question.5
Conclusion
In most instances the functional features of a product can be
copied unless the prior user has patent protection. The judicial
interpretation of functional features is extremely broad, extend-
ing perhaps even to those features whose sole function is eye
appeal. A defendant is not obligated to sacrifice the physical
requirements implicit in success to avoid imitation, but where
there is exact copying reasonable steps must be taken to avoid
confusing prospective purchasers. Colors may not be exclusively
appropriated. While secondary meaning is not an essential ele-
ment of unfair competition, it is evidence of likelihood of con-
fusion as to the source of the goods.
CAVEAT: On March 9, 1964, as this went to press, the
United States Supreme Court reversed both the Sears
case (n. 51), 32 U. S. Law Week 4206, and the Compco
case (n. 12 and 31), 32 U. S. Law Week 4208. It is still
uncertain how these opinions will affect the substance of
this article.
48 Hygienic Specialties Co. v. H. G. Salzman, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 790 (S. D.
N. Y. 1960), rev'd. 302 F. 2d 614 (2d Cir. 1962). The earlier finding that a
secondary meaning existed was influenced by the inexpensive nature of the
imitated product, which in itself, brought a secondary meaning into exist-
ence.
49 Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S. D. N. Y. 1955).
50 Interlego A. G. v. Leslie-Henry Co., 214 F. Supp. 238 (M. D. Pa. 1963).
51 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., supra n. 44. See also Stif-
fel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F. 2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) cert. granted,
374 U. S. 826, 83 Sup. Ct. 1868, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1050 (1963) (oral argument
1/16/64, 32 U. S. L. Week 3261).
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